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Executive
Summary
Innovative  
self-financing models 
have significant potential 
to enable the adoption 
of retrofit technologies, 
thereby reducing fuel 
payers’ operating costs, 
while requiring zero  
capital expenditure
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his paper examines financial models capable of enabling the adoption 
of fuel-efficiency and alternative fuel technologies that profitably 
reduce the fuel use and resulting greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) of the 
shipping industry. 
The international shipping fleet is incredibly diverse in terms of the vessels used, 
as well as the purposes for which they are used and the conditions under which 
they operate. One of the only commonalities among the different shipowners and 
charterers is their shared experience of facing rapidly rising costs for maritime 
fuels. Fortunately, a wide range of retrofit technologies that can increase the fuel 
efficiency or otherwise lower the fuel costs of these vessels are available on the 
market today. Retrofitting the existing fleet is crucial to creating a healthy shipping 
industry. Efficient newbuild ships may offer a step change in efficiency but they 
will not, on their own, ensure an economically sound and sustainable industry. 
Newbuilds alone will not deliver the industry’s full potential fuel savings, and the 
industry does not want a “two-tier” market containing stranded, uneconomic 
older vessels. 
However, significant market barriers are preventing those retrofits from happening. 
For example, the capital-intensive nature of maritime retrofit technologies poses a 
significant barrier to their deployment, particularly given the capital-constrained 
nature of today’s shipping industry. Ship financing is a concentrated industry, 
with the top 40 banks holding more than 90% of the world’s $500 billion1 in 
shipping debt. Many of these sources of financing are reducing their shipping 
commitments, leaving shipping companies with restricted access to capital and 
credit. The top 10 lenders alone have reduced their shipping loan books by $50 
billion since 2008 as a result of the global financial crisis (Devabhaktuni & Kennedy 
2012). Another important barrier is the way that fuel is paid for in the industry, 
as there is a substantial split incentive between the shipowners, who would 
need to pay for the retrofits themselves, and the charterers, who pay for the fuel 
approximately 70% of the time and would therefore enjoy the savings resulting 
from the majority of upgrades.
This paper finds that a variety of innovative self-financing models have significant 
potential to enable the adoption of these technologies, thereby reducing fuel 
payers’ operating costs, while requiring zero capital expenditure (CapEx) from the 
owner or charterer2 and, in some cases, allowing them to keep the cost and risk of 
retrofits off their own balance sheets. Off-balance-sheet financing3 is likely to be 
attractive to both shipowners and charterers who may still be feeling the effects 
of the global economic contraction, as well as to highly diversified corporations 
that would not prioritize fuel-saving retrofits in their shipping fleet over investment 
opportunities more directly connected to their core lines of business.
Specifically, this paper considers one financial model that facilitates the adoption 
of retrofit technologies that improve a vessel’s fuel efficiency, and a complimentary 
model that allows for the converting of vessel engines to run on Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) or other alternative fuels. 
The beneficiaries of all of these models include owners, 
charterers, financiers, and technology vendors. Investors 
in these models are compensated through the distribution 
of fuel cost savings, at a rate that is proportionate to the 
costs and risks they assume, while technology vendors are 
able to increase their sales, and fuel payers can, depending 
on the structure, enjoy a percentage of the fuel savings 
immediately and 100% of the fuel savings after investors 
are repaid. Moreover, shipowners will also benefit from 
increasing the fuel efficiency of their vessel through a 
relevant combination of the direct fuel savings, improved 
compliance with current regulations, and greater likelihood 
of gaining business in a charter market increasingly 
concerned with fuel expenditures. 
The potential positive impact of these retrofit technologies 
on both cost savings and emissions reductions is substantial. 
In 2007, the international shipping fleet consisted of just 
fewer than 50,000 cargo ships and consumed an estimated 
277 million metric tons of fuel, releasing 870 million metric 
tons of CO2 in the process (IMO 2009). A hypothetical 
46,000-deadweight ton (DWT) bulk carrier that operates 
at sea for 225 days of the year could, by installing a certain 
bundle of fuel efficiency retrofit technologies costing 
approximately $1,000,000, enjoy a 10% increase in its fuel 
efficiency. This would deliver fuel cost savings of $500,000 
per year and reduce that ship’s emissions by 2,148 metric 
tons of CO2 per year. Alternatively (or additionally), 
switching to an engine that accepts LNG fuel, such as a 
dual-fuel system, would cost approximately $10,000,000 
and provide annual fuel savings of nearly $3,000,000, while 
also reducing emissions so as to ensure compliance with 
the requirements of low-emission zones.
Though the shipping sector’s diversity makes it difficult to 
accurately extrapolate these numbers and make industry-
wide predictions on the potential of specific fuel efficiency 
retrofit technologies, their general applicability to a range of 
ship models and operational cycles strongly suggests that 
there is a significant and profitable emissions-reduction 
potential to be found in scaling their adoption. For example, 
were the existing global shipping fleet to improve its overall 
average fuel efficiency by 10%, the industry would save 
$16.6 billion on fuel costs per annum and reduce its GHG 
by up to 87 million metric tons of CO2 per annum, while still 
enjoying strong annual growth.4 
This paper is part of a broader project aimed at 
accelerating fuel and carbon savings in the shipping 
industry. If you are interested in finding out more, 
or in participating in the financial models covered 
here, please see www.carbonwarroom.com and 
www.shippingefficiency.org, or email Victoria Stulgis on 
shipping@carbonwarroom.com. 
T
1 All monetary amounts given in USD unless otherwise stated
2 “Charterers” refer to those who own the cargo transported by international vessels and will often 
charter an entire vessel to ship their goods.
3 A form of financing in which large capital expenditures are kept off a company’s balance sheet 
through various classification methods. Off-balance-sheet financing allows companies to keep their 
debt-to-equity (D/E) and leverage ratios low, especially if the inclusion of a large expenditure would 
break negative debt covenants.
4 Calculated from 2007 IMO estimates for international shipping fuel consumption (227 million 
metric tons of fuel) and CO2 emissions (870 million metric tons) and a fuel price of $600/metric ton 
(which is a low estimate, as MGO and MDO prices are considerably higher—IMO 2009).
Key Findings
Technology Options
•  Shipowners have a number of technology options 
for increasing their profitability in today’s market 
and under current regulations. 
•  Most of these options can be retrofitted (installed 
onto existing ships), and thus offer an alternative 
solution to continued investment in more efficient 
newbuilds.
•  Two such options are considered in this paper:
•  Fuel efficiency retrofits: A variety of physical 
and operational modifications that increase 
the fuel efficiency of ships and allow them to 
burn less fuel while hauling the same amount 
of freight.
•  Alternative fuel engine conversions: Engine 
conversions allow a ship to run on a fuel that is 
cheaper than oil and produces lower emissions. 
This paper focuses on dual-fuel LNG engine 
conversions, though other alternative fuels 
are briefly considered, and could be important 
future options.5 
•  Both of these options save money, reduce the 
exposure of fuel payers to fuel price fluctuations, 
and allow shipowners to meet emissions regulations. 
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Market Barriers
•  As demonstrated by surveys with nearly 150 global shipping companies 
(Rehmatulla & Smith 2012), a number of market barriers are preventing 
these promising technologies from being widely adopted. 
•  Some of the barriers are general to the shipping industry, while others are 
specific to a certain technology. 
•  The barriers discussed in this paper include:
•  Lack of capital: Though payback periods are short, shipowners 
struggle to finance these technologies upfront.
•  Split incentives: Often the shipowner, who would need to pay for a 
technology upgrade, does not pay for the fuel costs of their vessel, 
and so would not see any benefit or even payback from investing in a 
retrofit. Meanwhile, it is not commercially attractive for a charterer to 
take on financing if the payback of a technology is shorter than the 
duration of the charter (with contract lengths varying from several 
months to 10 years). 
•  Measurement and verification [specific to fuel efficiency 
technologies]: Accurately calculating the fuel savings that result from 
a fuel efficiency retrofit requires a robust and reliable methodology 
and advanced monitoring equipment, both of which are nascent to 
the industry.
•  Lack of infrastructure [specific to alternative fuels]: There is a need 
for new fueling infrastructure and the guaranteed supply of alternative 
fuels, such as LNG, if shipowners are going to be able to depend on 
such fuels for their operations.
As demonstrated  
by surveys with nearly  
150 global shipping 
companies, a number 
of market barriers are 
preventing promising 
technologies from being 
widely adopted 
5 Carbon War Room, while interested in researching LNG fuel conversion options and the financing 
mechanisms associated, focuses solely on fuel efficiency technologies within the shipping industry.
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Third-Party Financing Models 
The shipping industry can adapt third-party financing models from the 
built environment and renewable energy sectors to overcome the issue of 
the significant capital costs of deploying retrofits. These sectors have also 
overcome split-incentive issues and incorporated measurement and verification 
technology into the financial package. This paper presents two such models, 
one tailored to facilitate the adaptation of fuel efficiency technologies, the other 
specific to alternative fuel engine conversions.
•  Model 1: The Self-Financing Fuel-Saving Mechanism (SFFSM)—This model 
is inspired by the Energy Service Companies (ESCO) model, as illustrated by 
Figure 2. The SFFSM facilitates the adoption of fuel efficiency technologies 
by either long-term time-chartered ships or owner-operated ships. 
•  The SFFSM secures the upfront capital investment cost of retrofit fuel 
efficiency technologies from a third-party financier.
•  Financiers recoup their return from the fuel cost savings generated by 
the gains in fuel efficiency afforded by the technologies. 
•  The innovation of the SFFSM is its focus on data, from collecting a 
ship’s baseline performance statistics and incorporating those into the 
calculation of return rates, to including measurement and verification 
techniques in order to accurately assess the efficiency gains achieved 
by the retrofit technologies. The assessment methodology, developed 
by University College London’s Energy Institute specifically for the 
SFFSM, is capable of quantifying fuel savings using new data collection 
technologies and methods (see Figure 1). 
•  Model 2: The Emission Compliance Service 
Agreement (ECSA)—This model facilitates dual-
fuel LNG engine conversion.
•  The ECSA uses third-party finance to enable 
vessels to convert to running primarily on 
LNG, though they retain the ability to switch to 
conventional bunker fuels if necessary. 
•  LNG fuel meets International Marit ime 
Organization (IMO) emission regulations, and in 
some regions is cheaper than low-sulfur bunker 
fuel and heavy fuel oil.
•  Under the ECSA, financiers receive their returns 
by hedging against the pricing spread between 
low-sulfur bunker fuels and natural gas. 
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Continuous monitoring begins 
(prior fuel consumption data 
estimated from noon reports)
Fuel savings area 
represents the savings 
over time attributed to 
the technologies
Fuel consumption 
as estimated from 
noon report data
Step change in 
performance from 
retrofit technologies
Using multivariate regression 
analysis, the baseline 
performance is estimated 
for how the ship would have 
performed post-drydock 
without the retrofit
By applying an agreed 
trend, the deterioration 
is accounted for (as 
ships deteriorate 
gradually over time, 
not just from hull-
fouling).
Standard drydocking 
increases performance
First dry-dock Time in operation 
Figure 1: Monitoring and Measurement to Calculate Fuel Savings
KEY: The solid black line represents the ship’s pre-dry-dock fuel consumption, whereas the dotted black line represents 
the estimation for how the ship would have performed post-dry-dock without the retrofit.  The blue line represents the 
consumption post retrofit.  The red line is the ship’s underlying gradual deterioration (other than hull fouling)
BU ILD INGSH IP
When it comes to financing efficiency technologies, 
a ship can be conceptualized as a “building on its side.” 
And with similar project costs but shorter paybacks 
(because the cost of fuel is so significant), retrofitting 
ships can in fact be equally attractive to investors. 
Given that energy efficiency in buildings is currently a 
$5.1 billion market, the potential for shipping is huge.
Figure 2: Adapting the Financial Model  
for Energy Efficiency in Buildings
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Improving fuel  
efficiency is now imperative 
to remaining competitive.  
Fortunately, retrofit 
technologies that are profitable 
and applicable to a great 
percentage of the bulk, 
container, and tanker ships 
exist today
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he last 10 years have seen a series of market factors fundamentally 
reshape the global shipping industry. Most importantly, the income 
streams of shipping companies have suffered greatly within the global 
economic contraction. Simultaneously, bunker fuel6 prices have risen 
substantially, environmental regulations have tightened, and shipping 
companies have become increasingly aware of their industry’s impact on the 
climate and environment. As a result, improving fuel efficiency or otherwise 
managing fuel costs is now imperative to remaining competitive on the seas. 
Fortunately, a number of retrofit technologies with the potential to greatly 
increase the profitably of bulk, container, and tanker ships exist and are widely 
available on the market. Retrofitting the existing fleet is essential to developing 
a healthy shipping industry for the coming decades. Efficient newbuild ships 
do offer a step change in efficiency, but they will not, on their own, make the 
entire industry economically and environmentally sustainable. The retrofitting 
of older ships with new technologies must also be pursued in order to avoid 
a “two-tier” market in which only the newest half of the global fleet is truly 
competitive. 
Of the range of retrofit options available, this paper focuses on two:
1.  Technologies for fuel efficiency: These are installed in suites or bundles 
that are custom-tailored for a given ship. These technologies include options 
for improving both operational practices and physical aspects of the ship’s 
design. Increased efficiency allows a ship to do the same amount of work 
with less fuel, thereby saving money and emissions.
2.  Technologies for alternative fuels: Specifically, ones known as “dual-fuel 
LNG engine conversions,” whereby a ship’s engine is converted to run on 
liquefied natural gas (LNG). LNG has a much lower carbon content than 
bunker fuel, in addition to a significantly lower SOx and NOx content, and 
is substantially cheaper than the low-sulphur bunker fuels required in a few 
key geographies, particularly North America.
While these retrofit options could greatly improve a shipowner’s ability to 
stay profitable under current market and policy conditions, they are not being 
widely adopted by the industry and very little capital is flowing towards their 
implementation—a situation that can be attributed to some significant and 
pervasive market barriers.
The overarching barriers discussed in this paper include a lack of access 
to capital and credit for financing these expensive retrofits, and the “split-
incentive” (sometimes called “principal-agent”) problem. An additional barrier 
specific to the fuel efficiency technology option involves the lack of a rigorous, 
robust, and reliable methodology to calculate the actual fuel savings that result 
from the adoption of those technologies, and the associated need to accurately 
measure a ship’s baseline fuel consumption. Meanwhile the dual-fuel LNG 
engine conversion option has the specific barrier of the need for a new global 
fueling infrastructure and a guaranteed supply of LNG fuel. 
This paper suggests that innovative financial models 
adapted from other sectors can support the movement 
of capital towards these money-saving and carbon-
reducing retrofits in the shipping industry. These 
models, which use third-party finance and can be 
structured as “off-balance-sheet,” can be adapted from 
the built environment and renewable energy sectors in 
order to overcome the general barrier of the significant 
capital costs of maritime retrofit technologies, as well 
as the split-incentive barrier. Additional efforts will be 
required to address other barriers and complexities 
specific to the shipping industry and each individual 
technology. Nevertheless, this paper finds that these 
models are, today, sufficiently capable of underwriting 
and apportioning the risks of market-ready and 
economically viable retrofit technologies so as to 
substantially accelerate their deployment. 
Specifically, this paper analyzes two financial models 
(one for each of the two technology options discussed 
above) that will reduce fuel payers’ operating 
costs and require zero CapEx from the shipowner 
or charterer. Both models are “self-financing,” as 
they involve a mechanism for sharing future fuel 
cost savings in order to bring in the third-party 
capital needed to cover upfront costs. In fact, 
cost savings are at the core of these models, as 
they are designed to ensure that compensation 
of involved parties is proportionate both to their 
costs and to the risks that they are taking, with the 
net savings after those deductions going back to the 
fuel payer. 
T
6 ”Bunker fuel” is a general term for a variety of types of heavy fuel oils that are used to fuel ships, including Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO), the highest density and most polluting fuel, 
which is produced as residual fuel during the crude oil refining process.
This paper suggests 
that innovative financial 
models adapted from 
other sectors can  
support the movement 
of capital towards these 
money-saving and 
carbon-reducing retrofits 
in the shipping industry
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The beneficiaries of innovative self-financing models such as these include 
the shipowner, the fuel payer (owner or charterer), the financier, and the 
technology vendors. The vendors will increase their revenues, the financiers 
will enjoy attractive returns, and the charterers will save on fuel costs, while 
the shipowners will ultimately benefit from improving their vessel such that 
it either has greater fuel efficiency or burns cheaper fuel, while meeting 
regulatory compliance. 
The first financial model discussed in this paper supports the retrofitting of fuel 
efficiency technologies onto existing ships, and was developed by a consortium 
of the Carbon War Room (CWR) in cooperation with PricewaterhouseCoopers 
(PwC) and University College London (UCL). The model put forth by this 
consortium is called the Self-Financing Fuel-Saving Mechanism (SFFSM), and 
provides financing suitable for retrofits on either long-term time-chartered 
ships or owner-operated ships. The SFFSM aims to offer 100% of the needed 
capital investment via a third party, and financiers in this model enjoy their 
returns from the fuel savings generated by efficiency gains. This paper also 
mentions another model for fuel efficiency retrofits, known as Save As You 
Sail (SAYS), which was developed by the Sustainable Shipping Initiative. SAYS 
is a solution for retrofitting vessels operating in the short-term time-charter 
market. This paper focuses mainly on the details of the SFFSM, with some 
additional description of SAYS, and a brief discussion of the relative merits and 
differences between the two.
The second financial model discussed in this paper uses third-party finance 
to enable dual-fuel LNG engine conversion retrofits, which entail converting 
vessels to run primarily on LNG, but with the ability to switch to conventional 
bunker fuels if necessary. Known as the Emission Compliance Service 
Agreement (ECSA) model, this system was designed by Clean Marine 
Energy and was originally intended for the North American market, where a 
combination of upcoming emissions regulations and low natural gas prices 
have created a favorable landscape for LNG-fuel-based retrofits. Under the 
ECSA model, financiers receive their returns by hedging against the pricing 
spread between low-sulfur bunker fuels and natural gas fuels. The ECSA model 
provides shipowners with certainty about their fuel costs over the long term 
by contracting a dedicated natural gas supply for converted ships, and also 
ensures their compliance with  IMO emissions regulations. 
Methodology
The ideas in this paper were developed through a review of the financial 
models developed by a variety of organizations, including CWR, Clean 
Marine Energy, and the Sustainable Shipping Initiative. The pros and cons 
of their approaches were reviewed with the following parameters 
in mind: 
•  Does the model address the market barriers identified? 
•  Does the model support the technology options identified? 
•  Will the model make those technologies attractive to key 
industry actors? 
Further Research
This paper is not a full review of all of the existing 
retrofit-financing initiatives in the industry, nor is 
it a review of all available maritime fuel efficiency 
technologies or maritime alternative fuels. The 
dynamics of the different markets within the shipping 
industry mean that there will never be a “one-size-
fits-all” financial model. Rather, different solutions will 
complement each other and may even work together 
(e.g., a dual-fuel LNG engine conversion could be 
implemented at the same time as fuel efficiency 
retrofits). Furthermore, these new financial models 
are continuously evolving, as experiential learnings are 
gleaned from their initial deployments. The aim of this 
paper is therefore to share the existing knowledge of 
and experience with just two of these models and to 
stimulate a discussion around them, thereby creating 
further opportunities for their deployment, testing, 
and refinement.
Further research that would complement or build upon 
this paper might include an exploration of the detailed 
fuel savings per ship/per trip/per technology etc., as 
well as an understanding of the impact of fuel price 
volatility on the shipping sector. In addition, further 
research into LNG-specific topics might include an 
economic analysis of LNG opportunities for shipping, 
as well as an environmental impact assessment of the 
development of LNG for shipping.
The dynamics  
of the different  
markets within  
the shipping industry  
mean that there  
will never be a  
“one-size-fits-all”  
financial model
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Fuel costs 
account for as much 
as half of a container 
ship’s operating expenses, 
and for some ships 
that percentage is 
even greater 
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he last 10 years have seen a series of trends 
fundamentally reshape the global shipping 
industry, including a substantial rise in the price of 
bunker fuel, a tightening of environmental regulations, 
and a new focus by shipping companies themselves 
on the climate impacts of their industry. These three 
trends have come in the midst of a global economic 
contraction that caused a drop in the income streams 
of shipping companies. Together these factors have, 
of late, created a strong motivation for the industry 
to seek out cost-saving opportunities such as retrofit 
technologies. 
1. Rising Fuel Costs
Due to the rising price of bunker fuel (Figure 3), 
fuel costs have become a significant proportion of a 
ship’s total operating expenses over the past decade 
and, as a result, an increasingly important factor in 
determining a shipping company’s revenue, revenue 
projections, and profitability. The World Shipping 
Council recently reported that fuel costs account 
for as much as half of a container ship’s operating 
expenses, and for some ships that percentage is even 
greater (WSC 2009). 
Figure 4 illustrates the degree to which fuel costs 
(expressed as a share of total revenue) have grown in 
significance in the last decade. The leading analysts 
of energy commodities (e.g., IEA, EIA) all forecast 
that oil prices will continue to increase over time as 
supply struggles to keep up with the growing energy 
demand of an expanding global economy. In today’s 
volatile shipping market, where tanker and dry bulk 
daily earnings can vary significantly from one quarter 
to the next (PwC 2011), shipowners and operators 
face a particularly strong incentive to minimize their 
exposure to the additional source of uncertainty and 
financial risk created by this new instability in oil 
prices. In this context, new technologies that increase 
a ship’s fuel efficiency or otherwise stabilize its fuel 
expenditures—thereby reducing fuel’s percentage 
of operating expenditures—could have a significant 
impact on a company’s bottom line.
Figure 4: Fuel Costs as % of Revenue for Chemical 
Tankers
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Figure 3: Conventional Bunker Fuel (HFO) Annual 
Average Price in $/Metric Ton Over the Last Decade
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2. New Regulations
Emission Control Areas 
Emission Control Areas (ECAs), which regulate the quality of fuel burned 
within defined “special areas” to reduce marine emissions and air pollutants, 
are enforced in many of the world’s waterways that are close to populated 
areas. ECAs impose additional operating costs on the ships that must travel 
through them, as most ships must at some point on their routes. To date, 
ECAs have been enacted by the IMO (within Annex VI of the International 
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships) in the Baltic Sea 
(2006), the North Sea/English Channel (2007), North America (2012) and 
the US-Caribbean Sea (expected in 2014). Currently, ships must burn fuel 
that has a sulfur content of less than 1% when operating in ECAs, but that 
sulfur limit will drop to 0.1% on 1 January, 2015. Shipowners operating wholly 
or partially in ECAs have three main options by which to comply with 2015 
ECA regulations (<0.1% sulfur content): 
1.  Switch from HFO to a low-sulfur fuel when traveling through an ECA—both 
Marine Gas Oil (MGO) and Marine Diesel Oil (MDO)7 with sulfur contents of 
<0.1% are available on the market and do not require any engine retrofits 
to use.
2.  Stick with a fuel that is >0.1% sulfur and invest in an “exhaust gas scrubber” 
retrofit technology.
3.  Perform a retrofit conversion of a ship’s engine so that it is capable of 
running on LNG or another low-sulfur alternative fuel for travel through 
an ECA.
Currently, the majority of the international fleet practices the first option 
of “fuel switching” from HFO to MGO and MDO. However, more and 
more sea lanes are adopting ECA standards, thus increasing the 
frequency with which ships must switch fuels, driving up demand for 
low-sulfur MGO and MDO fuels and correspondingly driving up the 
prices of those fuels, which already command a premium compared 
to HFO (Figure 5). These factors will likely make the alternative 
options of retrofitting a ship with either exhaust gas scrubbers or 
an engine conversion more economically attractive.
Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI) and Ship 
Energy Efficiency Management Plan
In addition to creating stricter and more numerous 
ECAs as a method for reducing SOx, in 2013 the IMO’s 
Marine Environment Protection Committee enacted 
two measures aimed at addressing the CO2 emissions 
of the shipping industry. The first of these measures, 
known as the Energy Efficiency Design Index (EEDI), 
sets a minimum design standard for all newbuilds that 
is based on a ship’s design efficiency measured in CO2 
per metric ton nautical mile (MEPC 62, 2011). The EEDI 
is mandatory and its standards will be tightened every 
five years between 2015 to 2030. 
The second of these measures, the Ship Energy 
Efficiency Management Plan, applies to all existing 
vessels in addition to newbuilds, and requires ships 
to have a plan on board but does not impose any 
limits on the amount of CO2 emitted (MEPC 62, 2011), 
with the aim of encouraging increased efficiency 
through operational measures (e.g., better fuel/
energy management as implemented by the crew). 
Figure 5: Price Spreads between HFO and MGO
In October 2012, 
Cargill, Huntsman, 
and UNIPEC UK publicly 
announced that they 
would no longer charter 
the least efficient ships 
in the global fleet
Heavy Fuel Oil  
(IFO 380)
Low-Sulfur Fuel: Marine Gas Oil 
(MGO)
Singapore $602.00 $926.50
Rotterdam $601.50 $908.50
Houston $590.50 $1,021.00
Price spreads between Heavy Fuel Oil (IFO 380) and Low-Sulfur Fuel (MGO) per metric ton
Real-time prices in USD for July 2013 (Source: Bunkerworld).
7 Marine Gas Oil and Marine Diesel Oil are available in low-sulfur 
specifications.
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3. The “Triple Bottom Line”
Though perhaps more slowly than other, more consumer-oriented industries, 
the shipping industry of late is embracing the idea that considering the “triple 
bottom line” in making corporate policy decisions, such as by choosing 
to invest in increased fuel efficiency and thereby reducing CO2 emissions, 
represents a way for companies to increase their market share and revenue. 
In particular, demand-side stakeholders within the industry (e.g., retailers 
and charterers) have increasingly expressed their desire for more efficient 
vessels through a variety of market signals. For example, retailers 
including IKEA and Wal-Mart, as part of the Clean Cargo Working Group 
(see: bsr.org/en/our-work/working-groups/clean-cargo), are collaborating 
with leading container shippers to reduce their carbon footprints. Meanwhile, 
in the tank and bulk charter market, charterers are beginning to factor vessel 
efficiency into their commercial decision making. Exemplifying this trend, Cargill, 
Huntsman, and UNIPEC UK publicly announced in October 2012 that they would 
no longer charter the least efficient ships in the global fleet. Cargill, in particular, 
implemented a company policy against chartering “F”- and “G”-rated ships, 
as defined by the “A to G” Greenhouse Gas Emission Rating established by 
RightShip and CWR (see: shippingefficiency.org). Finally, other industry players 
including ports and banks have begun to embed efficiency information into 
their commercial operations. Ports, such as Prince Rupert and Metro Vancouver 
are now offering discounts to more efficient vessels, while the KfW IPEX Bank 
has evaluated the vessels in its shipping portfolio using the EEDI methodology. 
This increased demand for more efficient vessels provides further incentive to 
owners and operators to retrofit.
One major shipping company that has already begun 
to enjoy success as a result of having embraced 
the concept of the “triple bottom line” is Maersk. 
In 2013, Maersk met its internal target to reduce its 
emissions from its 2007 levels by 25% before 2020. 
It was able to achieve its goal seven years ahead 
of schedule by implementing a variety of different 
efficiency initiatives, including slow steaming and the 
removal of bulbous bows from the majority of its fleet 
(Maritime Executive 2013). Maersk has announced 
that its commitment to reduce its carbon footprint has 
benefited its business in a variety of ways, including 
making the company more cost-competitive and 
improving customer relations. Through slow steaming 
alone, Maersk generated an annual cost saving of 
$300 million (SSI 2011). Case studies of successes 
such as this are influencing the rest of the industry to 
look for ways to follow suit.
Retrofit 
Technology 
Options
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Given that 
charterers and shippers, 
banks, ports, and other 
stakeholders are increasingly 
scrutinizing the comparative 
fuel bills of vessels, the first 
shipowners to take action to 
make their ships more fuel 
efficient will be rewarded 
with increased market 
competitiveness
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n light of market and regulatory trends, owners of older 
vessels may struggle to stay in operation and compete 
with the more efficient new vessels slated to come online 
in the next decade. Fortunately, a number of technology 
options are widely available on the market that can be 
retrofitted (installed onto existing ships), and thus offer 
an alternative solution to continued investment in more 
efficient newbuilds, which only serves to exacerbate 
the current overcapacity within the industry. Given 
that charterers and shippers, banks, ports, and other 
stakeholders are increasingly scrutinizing the comparative 
fuel bills of vessels, the first shipowners to take action to 
make their ships more fuel efficient will be rewarded with 
increased market competitiveness. 
The best retrofit technologies for staying profitable 
under today’s conditions of high fuel prices and increasing 
regulations include the following options:
1.  Installing technologies that improve a ship’s fuel efficiency 
(these can act upon both design and operational inefficiencies).
2.  Switching to cheaper fuels with lower carbon and sulfur content, 
either drop-in fuels or those that require engine conversion, such 
as LNG.
3.  Installing emissions-reduction technologies (exhaust gas scrubbers, etc.).
4.  Adopting renewable energy sources to augment propulsion (kites and 
flettner rotors to harness the wind, etc.) or auxiliary power (solar panels, 
etc.).
As mentioned, this paper will focus specifically on financial models for 
improving fuel efficiency (option 1) or switching to fuels with lower carbon 
content (option 2), both of which allow ships to decrease their operating 
costs and potentially even increase their revenue through expanded market 
share. The installation of emissions-reduction technologies (option 3), such 
as scrubbers, may be pursued via a financial model quite similar to Clean 
Marine Energy’s ECSA that allows for engine conversions. Financial models for 
renewable energy sources (option 4), are less prevalent in the industry today 
and therefore not covered in this paper, mainly because few renewable energy 
technologies have been deployed on vessels at commercial scale. Options 3 
and 4 are both, however, being pursued in other projects of CWR and industry 
stakeholders.
The following subsections offer an overview of the two technology options 
considered by this paper, and a summary analysis of their likely economic and 
environmental costs and benefits.
1. Fuel Efficiency Technology Retrofits
A range of retrofit technologies are widely available 
on the market that can improve a vessel’s daily fuel 
consumption without impacting deliveries, processes, 
or any other aspect of business. 
A number of efficiency technologies have already seen 
some moderate uptake by shipping companies, and 
therefore offer illustrative case studies of fuel-saving 
successes. Many of these technologies can only be 
installed while the ship is in dry-dock, which is an 
expensive process requiring a ship to be taken out 
of service. As a result, in most cases the installation 
of retrofits only becomes economically viable when 
it is aligned with a vessel’s pre-scheduled dry-dock. 
Fortunately, most vessels, on average, enter into 
dry-dock every five years8 to undergo planned 
maintenance and address hull fouling,9 which in and 
of itself can have a significant degrading impact on a 
vessel’s fuel consumption. 
I
8 Bulk, tanker and containerships require two dry-dockings in a five-year period with no more 
than three years between dry-dockings, but there are exceptions, such as the use of underwater 
inspections for one of the surveys (in the five-year dry-dock cycle) for vessels under 15 years old. 
9 The term generally used to describe the settlement and growth of marine plants and animals 
on ships’ submerged hulls. Fouling severity depends on many factors, e.g., water salinity, light, 
temperature, pollution and nutrient availability, with the most severe fouling occurring in tropical, 
shallow waters (International Paint 2013).
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A Snapshot of the Most Common Fuel Efficiency Retrofit Technologies
Propeller Boss Cap Fins 
Propeller boss cap fins consist of small fixed fins attached to the 
propeller hub. A standard propeller generates a vortex at the center 
of its wake. By adding fins to the propeller boss cap, some of this 
rotational energy can be recaptured and used for propulsion work 
(Fathom 2013). 
•  Projected fuel savings: 1–3% over the lifetime of the ship, though 
some manufacturers claim more. (HSVA; Mewis 2006; IMarEST 2010). 
Rudder Modifications 
The rudder generates about 5% of the ship’s overall drag. Advanced 
rudder designs that are coordinated with the design of the ship’s 
propeller are able to improve water flow and reduce drag from the 
rudder (Fathom 2013).
•  Projected fuel savings: 3–6% projected fuel savings over the 
lifetime of the ship (Hollenbach 2011).
Mewis Duct 
The Becker Mewis Duct® is a power-saving device developed for full-
form slower ships and consists of two fixed elements mounted on the 
vessel: a duct positioned ahead of the propeller; and an integrated fin 
system within the duct. The duct straightens and accelerates the water 
flow into the propeller and also produces a net forward thrust. The fin 
system provides a pre-swirl to the ship propeller, which increases the 
propeller efficiency and also reduces the hub vortex, tip vortex and the 
rotational losses to improve fuel efficiency (Becker Marine Systems). 
•  Projected fuel savings: 3–8% over the lifetime of the ship (Becker 
Marine Systems).
Hull Surface Coating 
Ship hulls are subject to diverse and severe hull fouling, which can 
negatively affect the hydrodynamics of a hull by increasing the power 
required to travel, and therefore the fuel consumption. Protective 
coatings can inhibit both organic and inorganic growth on ship hulls, 
as they are designed to both reduce hydrodynamic drag and prevent 
the build-up of marine organisms (Fathom 2013).
•  Projected fuel savings: Up to 8% over the lifetime of the dry-dock 
cycle (circa five years) (Fathom 2013).
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Costs and Benefits of Fuel Efficiency  
Technology Retrofits
A variety of factors determine the costs (e.g., cost of 
technology and installation costs) and benefits (e.g., 
cost savings) of fuel efficiency retrofits, including: a 
given ship’s type, size and age; its number of days at 
sea per annum; its baseline fuel consumption; and, of 
course, the fuel prices where it is operating. 
Shipowners have much to gain from increasing the 
fuel efficiency of their vessels. In the current market, 
vessels that are more fuel efficient are more likely to be 
hired, and in some cases can even command a higher 
day rate (Smith et al. 2013). Retrofitting can also 
result in increased asset value, particularly if owners 
are able to demonstrate efficiency improvements to 
banks. This can be done by contracting a classification 
society to verify the fuel efficiency improvements pre- 
and post-retrofit, so long as continuous monitoring 
equipment is installed along with the fuel efficiency 
technologies. Finally, fuel efficiency upgrades may 
confer additional soft benefits to shipowners, such 
as the marketing and publicity value of “greening” 
their fleet. 
2. Alternative Fuel Engine Conversion Retrofits
For many vessels operating wholly or part time in ECAs, converting to dual-
fuel engines presents an opportunity to meet ECA standards while reducing 
operating costs. A variety of factors determine if it is profitable to convert a 
vessel to run on alternative fuels, including a given ship’s type, size, and age, 
the amount of time it usually spends in an ECA, and, if converting to LNG, 
the regional cost and availability of that fuel. In light of these factors, fuel 
conversion should be considered on a vessel-by-vessel basis.
Switching to alternative low-sulfur fuels, such as LNG or biofuels (which 
can, in certain geographies, both cost less than petroleum-based fuels and 
emit less carbon), would allow for a ship to save money while reducing its 
emissions and complying with 2015 ECA regulations. While biofuels have 
the technical potential to be drop-in fuels (i.e. their use would not require an 
engine conversion—they could be burned in the same engine that previously 
burned a petroleum-based fuel), there are currently no commercially viable 
biofuel bunker production facilities in the world. Therefore, as the commercial 
market for alternative biofuels for shipping is nonexistent, this paper focuses 
on a technology known as “dual-fuel LNG engine conversion,” which does 
require a retrofitting of the ship’s engine. 
Dual-Fuel LNG Engine Conversion Retrofits
Currently, LNG-fueled engines are manufactured by established engine 
manufacturers, such as Wärtsilä, Rolls-Royce, and MAN Diesel & Turbo. 
There are two different types: dual-fuel engines that are able to run on LNG 
or conventional bunker fuel; and “LNG lean-burn mono-fuel engines” that 
can only burn LNG fuel. Dual-fuel engines allow for vessels to run primarily 
on LNG while retaining the ability to switch to conventional bunker fuels 
when/if necessary. The financial model featured in this report focuses on 
these dual-fuel LNG engine conversions, as LNG is not currently available in 
all sea lanes and retaining the ability to switch fuel is necessary at present 
for a global fleet. 
Ships have been running on LNG since 2001 and, as of October 2013, 42 ships 
in the world were using LNG as a fuel when and where possible (European 
Shortsea Network 2013). Converting a vessel to run on LNG requires not 
only modifications to the ship’s engine but also, for example, the installation 
of a sophisticated system of special fuel tanks, a vaporizer, and double 
insulated piping. A variety of factors, including the ship’s type, size, and 
age, determine whether or not a vessel is suitable for LNG conversion, 
as some ships may not be able to accommodate retrofitted fuel tanks, 
while the expected lifespan of other ships may not justify the cost 
of conversion (DNV 2011). 
In the current  
market, vessels  
that are more fuel  
efficient are more  
likely to be hired,  
and in some cases  
can even command  
a higher day rate
Retrofitting vessels with, for example, a bundle 
of all the technologies listed here (which is by no 
means an exclusive list of available options), offers 
a solution for older vessels to stay in operation and 
deliver fuel efficiencies that are competitive with the 
new “eco-build” vessels now coming online, and may 
prevent those older vessels from being laid-up10 or 
scrapped prematurely. 
10 Not actively employed.
Costs and Benefits of LNG-Based Engine Conversion Retrofits
For ships operating wholly or part time in ECAs, converting to dual-fuel LNG 
engines presents an opportunity to meet ECA standards while reducing 
operating costs. Essentially, LNG conversion accomplishes the same goals 
as fuel switching between HFO and low-sulfur fuels. On the one hand, LNG 
conversion retrofits have a high upfront cost. On the other hand, LNG is 
today much cheaper than low-sulfur fuels in many regions (see Figure 6). 
Therefore, the most important factor in determining the economic viability of 
an engine conversion retrofit is the fuel price differential between low-sulfur 
fuel and LNG. 
Currently, the LNG market has significant regional price differences, with 
North American prices being the cheapest, followed by European prices 
and then Asian prices (Figure 7), so the savings to be had by converting will 
vary around the world.
From an air pollution perspective, natural gas is significantly cleaner when burned 
than traditional marine bunker fuel. Specifically, LNG emits 25% less CO2, 90% 
less NOx, 99% less SOx, and 100% less particulate matter than the equivalent 
amount of bunker fuel.11 However, the use of natural gas entails its own set of 
environmental and GHG challenges, particularly that of potential methane 
leakages during natural gas extraction and/or transportation, and the potential 
for methane slippage12 at the engine’s exhaust for certain engine types, which 
may negate the majority of the climate benefits conferred by the lower emissions 
of LNG when burned (ICCT 2013). While a suite of technologies do exist that 
could improve natural gas extraction emissions profiles, they are not being widely 
used anywhere in the world today, and this paper does not consider them in its 
assessment of the potential environmental and cost benefits associated with the 
use of natural gas by the shipping industry.
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Figure 6: US Historical Oil and Gas Prices Illustrating the Price Decoupling of Natural Gas and Oil
Source: Bloomberg Financial Markets; New York Times, 25 February 2011.
Source: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Market Oversight, 
June 2013.
Figure 7: Liquefied Natural Gas: 
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Comparable Alternatives to Engine Conversion: Scrubber Retrofits
In markets that have limited access to cheap natural gas (e.g., Northern 
Europe), shipowners may consider installing “scrubber” technology to 
lower emissions and comply with regulations within ECA zones.13 Scrubbers 
allow ships in these ECAs to continue to burn traditional bunker fuel, yet still 
benefit from the savings created by the price difference between (cheaper) 
traditional bunker fuel and the low-sulfur diesel that would be required 
without scrubber technology. It might likewise be more financially rational to 
install a scrubber rather than convert the engine to use alternative fuels in the 
case of older vessels that only have five to 10 years left in their useful life. For 
the sake of this paper, however, the scrubber technology option will not be 
explored further, as the financial model for scrubbers 
is similar to that for dual-fuel LNG conversion (in 
that the payback and return are generated 
from future fuel cost savings).
There are two main types of natural gas: conventional 
and unconventional. The extraction of unconventional 
shale gas has significant additional environmental 
impacts besides the potential for methane emissions 
inherent in the use of any type of gas, and a significant 
debate around the near- and long-term environmental 
implications of developing unconventional resources 
is ongoing, including concerns over air quality, water 
resources, and community impacts (Howarth et al. 
2011). It should be noted that shipowners using LNG as 
a bunker fuel will not have any control over the source 
of the fuel that their vessels consume (conventional or 
unconventional). 
Finally, the recent and rapid expansion 
of natural gas exploration and drilling 
means that the regulatory landscape 
of natural gas extraction will likely be 
uncertain in the short term. Further 
regulations could add to the cost 
of LNG—for example, the IEA 
estimates that precautions to 
manage some of the negative 
environmental and health 
impacts of unconventional 
shale gas would add 7% to 
its cost in the United States, 
resu l t ing  in  a  somewhat 
reduced price gap between LNG 
and MGO.
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The recent and rapid 
expansion of natural gas 
exploration and drilling 
means that the regulatory 
landscape of natural  
gas extraction will  
likely be uncertain in  
the short term
11 This does not incorporate lifecycle GHG 
emissions, including potential methane leakage.
12 Methane slip occurs at the point of 
combustion, and refers to the trace of gas 
fuel that passes non-combusted through the 
engine and is emitted with the exhaust gas. 
13 While scrubbers will reduce NOx, SOx and 
particulate matter emissions, they do not 
reduce CO2 emissions. They also entail specific 
operating costs, including the disposal of a 
sulfur-rich sludge waste and increased power 
consumption (DNV 2011). 
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hile the two sets of proven retrofit solutions described previously can help 
shipowners stay profitable under today’s market and policy conditions, 
there is currently very little capital flowing towards their implementation. 
Through an analysis of available literature (e.g., Wang et al. 2010; Faber et 
al. 2011 & 2012; Maddox Consulting 2012), including the results of a survey 
with nearly 150 global shipping companies (Rehmatulla 2012; Rehmatulla & 
Smith 2012; Rehmatulla, Smith & Wrobel 2013), two general market barriers 
were identified as the main reasons why these retrofits are not occurring at 
a much faster pace. One additional specific barrier was identified for each of 
the two retrofit options discussed in this paper. 
1. General Barrier: Access to and Cost of Capital
The capital-intensive nature of maritime retrofit technologies poses a 
significant barrier to their deployment, particularly given the capital-
constrained nature of the shipping industry today. Ship financing is a 
concentrated industry, with the top 40 banks holding more than 90% of the 
world’s $500 billion in shipping debt. Many of these sources of financing 
are reducing their shipping commitments, leaving shipping companies with 
restricted access to capital and credit. For example, the top 10 lenders have 
reduced their shipping loan books by $50 billion (or 10%) since 2008 as a 
result of the global financial crisis (Devabhaktuni & Kennedy 2012). 
Though exacerbated by the recent slowdown in the global economy, these 
capital constraints are inherent to the shipping industry, as they stem from 
the risk and uncertainty of both the performance of the retrofit technologies 
and from a ship’s overall revenue. While some companies may be financially 
able to finance the retrofit from their own balance sheet, using third-party 
financing allows companies to free up their own capital for other uses. 
However, it is currently very difficult for a shipowner to obtain outside 
financing for new equipment (i.e. retrofits), even though the new equipment 
would make the asset more valuable and more appealing to charterers and 
would free up the shipowner’s cash to cover debt service. 
When financing retrofit technologies either on or off the balance sheet, 
there are risks associated not only with financing the retrofit but also with 
managing the risk—a process about which there is little track record or 
experience from which to learn within the industry. As a result, most banks are 
hesitant to be the first movers in financing retrofits, and they will not invest if 
they cannot be certain about the return on investment of a given technology 
or bundle of technologies. Private equity firms may be more willing to take 
on this risk for technologies with limited data or track records. 
In addition, the cost of capital varies among shipping companies of different 
sizes and standings—with blue chip and large companies facing lower costs of 
capital. For example, in August 2012 Maersk confirmed they could borrow from 
banks at 3.5%, while some unnamed Greek shipowners were paying a margin 
of 300 basis points over the London interbank offered rate (Lloyd’s List 2012). 
Finally, obtaining capital for the financing of retrofits onto existing ships is 
complicated by the need to manage relationships between various lenders. 
For example, if a shipowner is interested in taking out a loan to pay for a 
retrofit, the original lender will have senior lien on the mortgage of the asset 
and typically would be unwilling to give approval for a second mortgage. 
This paper later explores the built environment and 
the challenges and opportunities offered by energy 
efficiency retrofit technologies in that sector as 
analogous to the situation of fuel efficiency retrofits in 
the maritime shipping sector. The similarities allow for 
the slightly more developed financial models currently 
driving retrofits in the built environment to be adapted 
to shipping. For example, in the built environment (e.g., 
buildings), existing mortgages are a major barrier to 
obtaining the capital for energy efficiency retrofits, and 
are addressed in one of three ways:
1.  By the provision of off-balance-sheet finance that is 
structured as an Energy Service Agreement.14 
2.  By utilizing PACE (Property Assessed Clean 
Energy), a financial model that enables liens to be 
senior to the first position of mortgage holders. 
3.  By negotiating/working with the mortgage lender 
to show that the energy savings that result from the 
retrofit will improve the cash flow of the building 
and make it more likely that the lender will get 
repaid on their mortgage. 
These three methods for overcoming the capital barrier 
for building retrofits all have the potential to be adapted 
for the shipping industry.
Since 2008, 
the top 10 lenders  
have reduced  
their shipping loan 
books by $50 billion  
(or 10%) as a result  
of the global  
financial crisis 
W
14 An Energy Service Agreement is a contract that permits energy 
efficiency to be packaged as a service that building owners pay for 
through savings and that generally requires no (or minimal) upfront 
cost to the owner. It is an alternative to using equity or a traditional 
loan to retrofit a building.
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2.  General Barrier: Split Incentives
Split incentives (also commonly known as the “principal-agent problem”) 
refer to the difficulties that arise from a contract in which the two parties have 
different motivations and aims (IEA 2007). In the shipping industry, it occurs 
as a result of the different types of contracts between shipowners/operators 
and charterers, which disconnect the entity investing in efficiency with the 
entity directly paying for fuel, e.g., the time charter. 
Typically, a shipowner would be responsible for financing any retrofit 
technologies, but their charterers would enjoy the resulting savings on their 
fuel bill. This gives shipowners little incentive to invest in retrofits, as it makes 
no economic sense for them to spend their money on saving fuel when 
someone else is paying for it. 
Shipowners are further disincentivized from investing in retrofits by virtue of 
the fact that, historically, neither charter rates nor second-hand ship prices 
have consistently reflected the fuel efficiency of a given vessel (Smith et al. 
2013). As a result, only shipowners who have long-term agreements with 
charterers or who operate their own vessels would be able to recoup the cost 
of their technology investment via fuel cost savings (CE Delft 2009). While 
information and transparency surrounding vessel efficiency are improving 
in the sector, the UCL Energy Institute’s recent shipping efficiency report 
found that efficiency is still not being consistently and fully factored into daily 
charter rates (UCL 2013; Agnolucci, Smith & Rehmatulla). 
Finally, in some cases the payback period predicted for a retrofit may be 
longer even than the time a given owner plans to control a given ship, as 
ship ownership typically lasts five to eight years for many different ship 
types (Stott 2013).
From the perspective of the charterers, the split incentive is exacerbated by 
a persistent uncertainty around retrofit payback periods in light of today’s 
standard practices with respect to charter15 lengths. In most cases, it is not 
commercially attractive for a charterer to take on financing in order to invest 
in ships they do not own, as current charter durations last anywhere from 
several months to 10 years, while current data on the effectiveness of any 
given technology installed in isolation may not suggest a comparably short 
payback time for the investment. Most charterers will be unwilling to finance a 
retrofit if a ship’s charter expires before the estimated payback time is passed 
and profits are accrued (Blumsetin 1980; Fisher & Rothkopf 1989; Howarth & 
Winslow 1994; CE Delft 2009; Rehmatulla & Smith 2012). 
 
3.  Barrier Specific to Fuel Efficiency 
Retrofits: Lack of Measurement 
and Verification Methods
Fuel efficiency technologies abound, but the claims 
they make about their efficiency-improving values are 
equally numerous,16 and shipowners and financiers alike 
need valid performance data before adopting them. In 
an environment of competing and often difficult-to-
understand data from technology producers, the industry 
is sceptical of efficiency claims (Rojon & Smith 2014; 
Faber et al. 2009; Thollander, Palm & Rohdin 2010).
To secure capital, investment projects must be expected 
to yield a return in excess of some pre-defined minimum 
level. Unfortunately, isolating the cost-saving benefits 
of a retrofit intervention from the many drivers of fuel 
consumption (e.g., speed, weather, and operating area) 
is challenging, and often can only be done with levels of 
uncertainty similar in size to the predicted fuel saving 
that is being measured, particularly for ships without 
modern continuous monitoring systems. Moreover, the 
savings available from a retrofit can vary significantly 
from one ship type and size to another (e.g., from a 
container ship to a tanker), and can also depend on the 
starting specifications of the ship, making savings claims 
difficult and expensive to verify and/or guarantee. 
The savings 
available from a 
retrofit can vary 
significantly from 
one ship type 
and size to 
another
15 Arrangement for a ship to carry a certain cargo on a particular route; such deals usually cover 
a single trip. In a spot charter, the shipowner pays fuel and port charges, distinguishing spot 
business from time charters or long-term charters, where the charterer will pay for the fuel and 
port charges. 
16 Fathom Shipping, information specialists on maritime eco-efficiency, have identified more 
than 220 products across more than 60 technology categories, from more than 100 providers, 
currently available on the maritime market.
17 Bunkering is the process of supplying fuels to ships for their engines (that is, not to be 
transported as cargo)—in this case supplying LNG from the on-shore LNG facility to a ship’s 
bunker tanks.
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In addition, the industry has no publicly available data 
that demonstrates or compares the performance of 
fuel efficiency technologies when they have been 
installed in packaged bundles. Technology producers 
currently make performance claims based on the 
installation of only their own technology onto an 
otherwise baseline ship. But the greatest efficiency 
gains will always be achieved by installing a suite of 
technologies and upgrading various facets of ship 
design at once, particularly given that the dry-docking 
periods required to perform most retrofits are 
expensive. Unfortunately, the efficiency gains of 
these technologies when installed in a bundle, though 
greater, will not be the additive sum of the gains of 
individual technologies. Compounded by the issue of 
low trust in producer data, the absolute nonexistence 
of data on the performance of technologies in bundles 
presents a problem for shipowners attempting 
to judge the real opportunity available to them in 
retrofitting their ship—and in attempting to finance 
that upgrade. 
Industry-wide efforts have arisen in an attempt 
to combat some of these informational issues, 
in particular efforts to create standards for 
measurement, such as the International Organization 
for Standardization’s initiative to develop a common 
industry standard for measuring changes in hull and 
propeller performance (Lloyd’s List 2013e). While 
the development of measurement standards will be 
beneficial, using the financial models suggested in 
this paper to facilitate the adoption of fuel efficiency 
retrofits will require the installation of continuous 
data-monitoring systems in order to collect data on 
technology bundles and verify savings.
4.  Barrier Specific to Dual-Fuel LNG  
Engine Conversion Retrofits:  
Lack of LNG Bunkering Infrastructure
The most pressing barrier to the adoption of LNG fuels by the shipping 
industry is the lack of bunkering17 infrastructure to support LNG supply and 
delivery. That is to say, LNG infrastructure does not currently exist to deliver 
gas where marine vessels need it. While a significant increase in the number 
of bunkering terminals is expected in the coming decade, especially within 
ECAs, the present uncertainty of LNG fuel supply poses a critical barrier to 
engine conversion (Eide, M et al. 2012).
Unlike the other three barriers discussed above, the lack of bunkering 
infrastructure will not be entirely overcome by the financial models presented 
in the next chapter of this paper. However, LNG infrastructure is already 
developing on its own. For example, there are several natural gas liquefaction 
terminals planned and/or currently under construction in strategic US ports, 
specifically in the Gulf Coast, Great Lakes, Southeast and Pacific Northwest 
(Lloyd’s List 2013a). With respect to other bunkering regions, the Singapore 
Maritime Port Authority plans to open an LNG import terminal in 2013, and has 
already made significant investments in including LNG bunkering capabilities 
into the plans at their facilities (Lloyd’s List 2013d). In Europe, Belgium, Poland, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden, among others, have already developed or have 
plans to develop LNG infrastructure (Lloyd’s List 2013c). The EU Transport 
Council has recently announced plans for all 139 EU ports to be fitted with 
LNG bunkering infrastructure by 2025, an initiative for which the European 
Commission is setting aside €2.1 billion (Weekblad Schuttevaer 2013). 
The EU Transport 
Council has recently 
announced plans for  
all 139 EU ports to be 
fitted with  
LNG bunkering 
infrastructure  
by 2025
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n light of current market and regulatory forces, 
fuel efficiency and/or engine conversion 
retrofits offer an option for increasing the profitability 
of the existing fleet, though significant and pervasive 
market barriers are hindering the adoption of these 
technologies. The next section of this paper will 
discuss examples of innovative models built around 
third-party financing that have accelerated the 
deployment of various renewable energy and fuel or 
of energy efficiency technologies in other sectors—
models that CWR believes can, if properly adapted, 
overcome shipping’s market barriers and achieve 
similar accelerations for the industry. 
Adapting Third-Party-Finance 
Models from Other Sectors
Third-party-finance models have revolutionized 
the deployment of clean technologies in many key 
sectors and industries, including the renewable 
energy market and the built environment sector. To 
take the renewable energy market as an example, 
in 2003 Sun Edison introduced new third-party 
financing mechanisms to enable solar installations 
with no upfront costs to the user. This solar Power 
Purchase Agreement (PPA) has since become the 
dominant financing mechanism for solar installations. 
Similar models are already being adopted by other 
industries, such as the commercial buildings market. 
In the buildings market, Energy Service Companies 
(ESCOs) provide third-party financing for retrofits 
that improve the energy efficiency of a building, 
so that the landlord or tenants do not need to be 
burdened with the upfront costs of the retrofits on 
their own balance sheets. 
Third-party-finance models like these 
are now being introduced into 
the shipping industry, making 
it important to understand 
and overcome the specific 
challenges associated with 
the original models, as well as 
with the task of translating 
them to shipping.
PPAs and ESCO Models
A solar PPA is an agreement that enables an unrelated third party to finance 
and install solar generation capacity for the benefit of an electricity consumer. 
The agreement specifies that the third party will pay for and own the solar 
technology, and that the electricity consumer will purchase the electricity 
generated by the solar installation for a fixed period of time, thereby 
generating the payback and returns for the third party. By transferring the 
upfront capital costs of the solar project to a third-party entity, one either 
with greater access to or lower costs of capital, solar PPAs represented a 
significant innovation in cleantech financing, and new solar installations in 
the US have grown by an average of 61% per year since their introduction 
(SEIA 2013). 
ESCO models perform a role similar to PPAs in that they also enable 
third parties to finance the deployment of new technologies, in this case 
technologies that improve the energy efficiency of commercial buildings. 
Energy Services Companies (ESCOs) are, typically, large companies that 
specialize in demand-side energy services and that have been assisting their 
customers with energy efficiency retrofits for decades. 
The current ESCO model for energy efficiency in the built environment is 
focused on providing performance guarantees that help backstop energy 
efficiency upgrades, making it easier for projects to acquire financing. Under 
this model, an ESCO will typically enter into a performance contract with the 
asset owner. In one variation of this performance contract model, the ESCO, 
generally through third-party-finance partners, will invest all of the capital 
necessary to perform the retrofit. Alternatively, the asset owner may finance 
the project themselves via internal capital, a tax-exempt capital lease, or 
bond financing through a bank. In either case, the performance contract is 
in place to help give the capital provider more comfort that the project will 
generate enough savings to offset the costs of the retrofits. If the retrofits 
ultimately underperform, the ESCO will make a payment on the shortfall, as 
Figure 8, overleaf, illustrates.
By transferring 
the upfront capital costs  
of the solar project to a 
third-party entity, one 
either with greater access 
to or lower costs of capital, 
solar PPAs represented a 
significant innovation in 
cleantech financing
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Typically, an ESCO will provide energy efficiency 
services using one of three structures: 
1.  In a “guaranteed savings structure,” the asset owner 
receives a guaranteed amount and the ESCO gets the 
additional savings.
2.  In a “shared savings structure,” the asset owner and 
the ESCO agree to split the savings according to a 
percentage, such as 50/50. 
3.  In a “paid-from savings structure,” the ESCO receives 
a guaranteed amount and the asset owner gets the 
additional savings.
The primary advantage of performing a retrofit through 
a performance contract with an ESCO is that the 
ESCO has the expertise and experience needed to 
design and implement high-quality retrofit projects 
and to guarantee the savings from those projects. In 
some cases, the ESCO may also assist the asset 
owner with sourcing traditional financing or 
other incentives by connecting them with 
banks or utilities with which the ESCO 
has developed relationships. The 
ESCO market for built environment 
retrofit project installations and 
services exceeded $5.1 billion in 
2011 and is expected to reach 
$16 billion by 2020 (Pike 
Research 2012). 
Both the solar PPA and the ESCO models are in the process of reaching 
maturity as asset classes. This transformation in the solar industry was 
driven by gains in the transparency and auditability of panel performance;18 
the correlating development in the commercial building space has been the 
development of better and more appropriate measurement procedures to 
verify efficiency gains from retrofit technologies. This growing transparency 
has made both the solar PPA and the ESCO models more attractive financial 
vehicles to banks, insurance companies, and large corporations, as they can 
feel confident that the projects initiated under these models will provide them 
with steady returns and an attractive risk profile. In turn, this has dramatically 
lowered the cost of capital for those projects, from 10–20% to 6–8%. The ESCO 
and solar PPA markets are currently evolving even further, as hedge funds 
and private equity funds (which represent $4.2 trillion in investible assets) are 
beginning to compete for access with pension, mutual funds, and insurance 
funds (which represent $80 trillion in investible assets).
These third-party-finance models can be adapted from the built environment 
and renewable energy sectors to overcome the issue of the significant capital 
costs of deploying retrofits in the shipping industry, although certain barriers 
and complexities specific to the shipping industry will need to be 
addressed. For example, adapting the ESCO model will 
require the development of new shipping-specific 
methodologies and technologies to measure and 
monitor the performance of the efficiency 
technologies. In addition, for fuel efficiency 
retrofits, the shipping industry will need 
to develop a methodology by which 
performance gains can be attributed 
to specific technologies when 
installed in bundles, and generally 
to deal with the many variables 
and data uncertainties associated 
with vessels operating on the 
seas. This paper finds that while 
these challenges are real, the 
potential opportunity offered by 
retrofits, in terms of both financial 
and emissions savings, is even 
greater (Figure 9).
 
The ESCO market  
for built environment 
retrofit projects, 
installations, and 
services exceeded $5.1 
billion in 2011 and is 
expected to reach $16 
billion by 2020
18 Panel performance (the amount 
of electricity that is generated 
from a solar panel), is impacted 
by a variety of factors, including 
the efficiency of the panel, panel 
orientation, panel pitch, temperature 
and shade.
Figure 8: ESCO Flow of Payments
Source: Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati.
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Customer
ESCO
Utility bill
Energy Savings 
Performance Contract
Energy savings
Capital for projectReturns / Loan 
payments
Utility
Lender/ 
Investor
BU I LD INGSH IP
31INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL MODELS
WWW.CARBONWARROOM.COM
Third-Party Financing of Retrofits for the  
Shipping Industry
Currently, several shipping technology providers19 are 
working with lenders and banks to assist in the loan 
procurement for the purchase of their products. For 
example, MAN Diesel & Turbo, an engine manufacturer, 
has financed the installation of MAN Diesel fuel-saving 
technologies onto 30 vessels in this manner (Lloyd’s 
List 2013b). 
While such models based on more typical financing have 
the potential to continue to facilitate fuel cost savings 
for the shipping industry, more nuanced and innovative 
financial models are also needed in order to address the 
range of market barriers and fully realize the emissions- 
and cost-saving potential of retrofits. Figure 10 gives 
an overview of the two main models analyzed by this 
paper—the Self-Financing Fuel-Saving Mechanism 
(SFFSM), designed for fuel efficiency retrofits, and 
the Emission Compliance Service Agreement (ECSA), 
designed for dual-fuel LNG engine conversion retrofits.
Figure 10: Fundamental Features of Third-Party-Finance Models for Retrofits
19 To CWR’s knowledge, these include MAN Diesel & Turbo (engine and 
propeller manufacturer), Wärtsilä (engine and propeller manufacturer), 
and Jotun (hull coating company).
20 Premium hull coatings will only deliver the projected savings over the 
dry-dock period, while other technologies (boss cap fins, propellers) will 
deliver the savings over the lifecycle of the vessel.
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The Self-Financing Fuel-Saving Mechanism:  
A Model for Fuel Efficiency Retrofits 
The CWR has partnered with PwC, University College London (UCL), and 
a consortium of other stakeholders to develop a fuel efficiency retrofit-
financing model, called the Self-Financing Fuel-Saving Mechanism (SFFSM). 
This financial model is technology agnostic and is optimized to support the 
installation of a bundled suite of technologies that act upon different aspects 
of fuel inefficiency. Two key features of this model are a guarantee of fuel 
savings from the technology vendors and a sophisticated new data collection 
methodology that uses continuous monitoring equipment to accurately 
quantify and verify the fuel savings. 
 
Illustrative Financials of the SFFSM
The SFFSM features a tripartite contractual agreement (see Figure 11) 
between the technology partners, the fuel payer, and the financier. The retrofit 
technology companies supply/fit the vessel with their respective equipment 
at the vessel’s next scheduled dry-dock, and they provide performance 
guarantees to the shipowner or charterer (the fuel 
payer)—which will be verified by the monitoring 
company, whose technologies will also be installed 
at that time. The fuel payer is then the counterparty 
with the financier, and pays the technology providers 
at normal cost for their respective products.
The cost savings resulting from the efficiencies 
achieved (fuel savings) over a defined period are 
deposited into and accrue within a Special Purpose 
Vehicle (SPV)21 or escrow account.22 The fuel savings 
are then distributed to the financier at predetermined 
and agreed-upon periods to generate their payback 
and returns. Like in the ESCO model used in the built 
environment sector, the SFFSM can be financed using 
one of three structures: 
Payment to technology suppliers
Figure 11: Structure of the Self-Financing 
Fuel-Saving Mechanism
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1.  In a “guaranteed savings structure,” the fuel 
payer receives a guaranteed amount and the 
financier gets the additional savings.
2.  In a “shared savings structure,” the fuel payer 
and the financier agree to split the savings 
according to a percentage, such as 50/50. 
3.  In a “paid-from savings structure,” the 
financier receives a guaranteed amount and 
the fuel payer gets the additional savings.
Scaling the SFFSM will require significant 
funding, as each vessel’s retrofit will cost circa 
$300,000–$1.5 million, and around 9,500 vessels 
could be retrofitted each year. 
Key Features of the SFFSM
Along with the introduction of third-party financing, the innovation of the 
SFFSM is its focus on data—from collecting a ship’s baseline performance 
statistics and incorporating those into the calculation of return rates, to including 
measurement and verification techniques in order to accurately assess the 
efficiency gains achieved by the retrofit technologies. The methodology for 
doing this, developed by UCL’s Energy Institute specifically for the SFFSM, aims 
to quantify fuel savings using new data collection technologies.
Over the past decade, an increasingly varied and sophisticated suite of energy 
management software products have been developed for the maritime market 
that monitor, control, and optimize every aspect of vessel operation. These 
systems provide a platform for collecting and processing deep knowledge of 
vessel performance, such that the vessel’s owners and operators may know 
where the fuel is consumed and whether it was used efficiently and optimally 
or not. These products vary in complexity, from simpler systems that extract 
real-time data on fuel burn per mile, to complex systems that not only collect 
data on a range of both vessel and external parameters (such as wind, waves, 
sea current, trim, and vessel manoeuvring) but that also serve to improve 
the operational efficiency of the vessel through both voyage optimization 
(optimizing route or speed) and trim optimization.24 Monitoring systems are 
a required part of the SFFSM, and therefore those technologies, if not already 
fitted, will be covered by the same third-party funding package that is covering 
the other fuel efficiency technologies.
Scaling the SFFSM  
will require significant 
funding, as each vessel’s  
retrofit will cost circa 
$300,000–$1.5 million,  
and around 9,50023 vessels 
could be retrofitted  
each year
The projected payback period 
of the SFFSM for a given vessel 
is critically dependent on the 
following criteria: 
•  The percentage of fuel saved 
versus the predicted “baseline” 
fuel consumption that would 
have occurred if that vessel 
had been dry-docked but not 
retrofitted.
•  The vessel’s number of days at 
sea per year.
•  The vessel’s daily fuel 
consumption in tons (which 
will be dependent on how the 
vessel is operated).
•  Bulk fuel costs per ton in the 
geography where the vessel is 
operating. 
21 An SPV is typically used for the purpose of financing a project and/or establishing a structured 
investment vehicle that is separate to the parties and companies that set them up for tax and 
accounting purposes.
22 An escrow account is an arrangement made under contractual provisions between transacting 
parties, whereby an independent and trusted third party receives and disburses money for the 
transacting parties.
23 There are approximately 47,500 existing bulk, tanker and container vessels. Assuming each 
vessel dry-docks every five years, 9,500 vessels would approach dry-dock each year.
24 ”Trim optimization” assists in operating the ship in optimal trim and floating position 
depending on the ship’s characteristics and external factors (e.g., weather). “Trim” refers to the 
balance of a ship, and the difference between the draft at the bow and at the stern (attitude); 
adjusting the trim can minimize water resistance.
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Figure 12: Baseline Performance and the Consequence of Fuel Efficiency Interventions
Total change in fuel 
consumption from 
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(all tech and paint) 
Fuel savings
First dry-dock Time in Operation
KEY: The solid black line represents the ship’s baseline fuel consumption pre-retrofit, whereas the dotted black line 
represents the estimation for how the ship would have performed post-dry-dock without the retrofit.  The solid red line 
represents the consumption post retrofit.
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Continuous monitoring begins 
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Figure 13: Monitoring and Measurement to Calculate Fuel Savings
KEY: The solid black line represents the ship’s pre-dry-dock fuel consumption, whereas the dotted black line represents 
the estimation for how the ship would have performed post-dry-dock without the retrofit.  The blue line represents the 
consumption post retrofit.  The red line is the ship’s underlying gradual deterioration (other than hull fouling)
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Method for Verifying a Technology’s Fuel Savings
In order to verify the fuel savings resulting from a 
retrofit, the SFFSM uses two stages of data collection:
1.  Establish a baseline forecast for the fuel consumption 
of the ship with no retrofits.
2.  Measure the actual fuel consumption achieved for 
the ship by the retrofits.
Fuel efficiency retrofits are expected to occur at 
a regular dry-dock. In order to ensure that the 
performance of products that have benefits over the 
full dry-dock cycle (e.g., hull coatings) can be verified, 
the baseline forecast must cover the duration of a whole 
docking cycle (e.g., up to five years). Figure 12 shows 
the actual performance of a ship before the dry-dock 
during which efficiency retrofits are completed (black 
solid line), the forecast performance post-dry-dock in 
the event no retrofit is applied (black dotted line), and 
the actual measured fuel consumption post-dry-dock 
(red solid line). The cumulative difference between the 
baseline forecast and the measured fuel consumption 
is then the fuel savings. 
Ideally, the baseline fuel consumption is quantified 
using data from continuous monitoring equipment. 
However, if the equipment is not installed pre-retrofit, 
noon reports can be used to understand the ship’s 
fuel performance over time and the influence of 
variables such as ship speed and weather on fuel 
consumption. Also, baseline fuel consumption will 
be measured from a full dry-dock cycle pre-retrofit, 
given that a ship’s fuel performance will change over 
time. This is mainly due to the fact that hulls are often 
cleaned and recoated when ships are dry-docked 
for routine purposes, and such treatment normally 
results in a step change in fuel performance (see 
Figure 13). Fuel performance also degrades slowly 
but consistently over the life of a ship, due to long-run 
deterioration (for example, wear in the main engine 
and other machinery, hull plate deformations). When 
verifying the performance of a retrofit intervention, 
it is important that the verification method does not 
unfairly attribute either the benefits of a standard 
dry-dock performance gain or the long-term 
deterioration trend to the retrofit intervention. Figure 
13 depicts how these two exogenous influences on 
fuel performance can play out. 
Uncertainty
There is some uncertainty inherent in any measurement, and in the 
monitoring and performance analysis of a ship’s fuel consumption this 
uncertainty can be significant, to the point that the margin of error 
might be similar in magnitude to the percentage gains in performance 
potentially conferred by the retrofit itself. Reducing the uncertainty of 
ship performance data is critical to financing fuel efficiency retrofits, and 
therefore continuous monitoring technologies are greatly preferable to 
noon reports in establishing baseline consumption and any improvements 
post-retrofit. A recent report that performed a statistical analysis of the 
fuel consumption datasets of a large group of ships, in order to estimate 
the typical magnitudes of uncertainty, discovered that “data acquisition 
from an onboard continuous monitoring system yields a material reduction 
in the uncertainty” relative to the use of noon reports (Aldous et al. 
2013). However, even with continuous monitoring systems, that research 
ultimately concluded that it will never be possible to calculate the fuel 
savings resulting from an intervention without some level of uncertainty. 
Incorporating Operational Changes into the Baseline Forecast  
of Fuel Consumption
A ship’s fuel consumption is influenced not only by the technologies 
installed on the vessel but also by the conditions of its operation. For 
example, ship speeds, trim, loading, and weather conditions can all cause 
variation in the fuel consumption of a single ship over time. Furthermore, 
a ship’s operational geography, as well as the proportion of time it spends 
loaded, in ballast condition, or at anchor, all influence the rate of fouling 
on its hull and therefore the performance of, say, a coating system. Finally, 
a ship’s trading patterns and operational conditions may vary significantly 
year on year in response to the dynamics of the market and the charters in 
which it is employed. An industry-wide example of such variation is seen 
in the case of slow steaming, a practice adopted by many shipping fleets 
following the financial crisis in 2008 that resulted in significant decreases 
(30% and above) in fuel consumption. It is therefore very important to 
recognize and incorporate variations in a ship’s operating profile from 
one dry-dock cycle to the next into the baseline forecast of its fuel 
consumption. Building on the aforementioned research into uncertainty 
by Aldous et al. (2013), a number of multivariate linear regression models 
have been developed that are capable of using the preceding dry-dock 
cycle’s data to isolate the influences of key dependent variables (speed, 
weather, loading etc.) on fuel consumption. Having isolated the influence 
of these variables on the ship’s performance, these new regression models 
can be used to calculate a baseline forecast for fuel consumption under 
the operational conditions of the ship for the period after the retrofit, even 
if those conditions are not identical to the conditions of previous periods. 
The SFFSM: Impact on Market Barriers
The SFFSM offers the shipping industry a method for 
overcoming its barriers of capital and split incentives, 
and also allows the fuel efficiency technology sector to 
address its specific barrier of a lack of measurement and 
verification methods.
General Barrier: Access to and Cost of Capital
In designing the SFFSM, CWR addressed the lack of 
access to capital by collaborating with PwC and private 
equity financiers, based on findings that most traditional 
banks are currently hesitant to fund fuel efficiency 
retrofit projects on a large scale. Private equity firms are 
mainly attracted by the short paybacks of these retrofits, 
especially in light of the performance guarantees provided 
by the technology vendors under the SFFSM. 
General Barrier: Split Incentives
The SFFSM attempts to bridge a common disconnect 
between the economic incentives of the entity responsible 
for any technical/capital investments into a ship and its fuel 
efficiency and of the entity responsible for the fuel costs of 
that ship’s operation. The SFFSM is fundamentally designed 
to serve charterers, as they are the predominant fuel payer 
in the industry, and can ask for the model to be applied to 
vessels carrying their cargoes. The SFFSM currently only 
works for vessels on long-term charters, or else on owner-
operated vessels, as the financier will only invest in vessels 
that have a guaranteed contract of affreightment.25  
Barrier Specific to Fuel Efficiency Retrofits:  
Lack of Measurement and Verification Methods
To overcome a lack of data regarding the performance of fuel 
efficiency technologies, technology providers working with 
the SFFSM must be able to guarantee that their respective 
technologies will deliver a certain percentage of fuel savings 
when installed as part of a bundle of retrofits. Accurately 
verifying those fuel savings once the technologies are installed 
is fundamental to the SFFSM, and, as explained in a previous 
subsection, the SFFSM therefore requires that advanced new 
continuous monitoring equipment be installed onto each 
retrofitted vessel. 
Historically, fuel consumption measurement practices have 
been highly variable. In particular, the performance data of fuel 
efficiency technologies has been constrained to hypothetical 
conditions only (e.g., acceptance trials for a newbuild vessel), 
and therefore has not given investors much confidence in a 
technology’s actual abilities on the less-predictable ocean. 
Fortunately, the advent of sophisticated monitoring systems 
has provided a data source that, with rigorous deployment 
and processing, allows for the calculation of fuel savings with 
a manageable level of uncertainty.
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Save As You Sail: An Alternate Financial Model  
for Fuel Efficiency Retrofits
The SFFSM is designed to work either for vessels on long-term charter or 
else for owner-operated vessels, as the financier in the SFFSM is only able 
to confidently invest in vessels that have a guaranteed service contract that 
will ensure the vessel will be in use for the entire length of the financing 
period. 
The Sustainable Shipping Initiative has developed a similar financing model 
for installing fuel efficiency retrofit technologies onto vessels with short-term 
charters. This model, called “Save As You Sail” (SAYS), is different from the 
SFFSM in that it focuses on the short-term time-charter market (charters that 
last generally between one and two years) and is designed to overcome the 
specific split-incentive challenges of that market (Figure 14). Under SAYS, the 
shipowners themselves access the capital for the retrofits, as SAYS allows them 
to recoup their investment over the span of multiple time charterers. With a 
SAYS package, shipowners agree upon a “SAYS fee” (an added monthly cost 
that charterers pay to the shipowners). Charterers should theoretically agree 
to pay that additional fee given that the fuel cost savings that they will enjoy by 
using an efficient ship will exceed the amount of the SAYS fee. Those estimated 
savings are based on past performance monitoring data. Any outstanding 
charter party agreements can be amended to include the SAYS fee, and the 
SAYS fee will be built into the future charters of that ship as well. 
Under SAYS, up to 80% of the upfront costs of the technologies are covered 
by a loan from ABN Amro bank, with the remainder paid by the shipowner. 
Over two or three years, the shipowner pays back the loan plus the fixed-
rate interest. 
The SAYS model specifically focuses on time charters shorter than 
three years. For this model to be effective, charterers will need to 
accept an arrangement where they pay more for vessels that are more 
fuel efficient. The SAYS model currently does not offer a solution 
for securing the second and third charterers post-retrofit, and so until 
the charter market guarantees that there will always be someone willing 
to pay a higher fee for a more efficient vessel, the owner will run the risk 
of their ship not being chartered again when their first charter contract 
concludes. If proven in concept, and if owners and lenders receive stronger 
indications that they will be able to secure their next charters, then this 
model could be successful in enabling capital to move towards vessels 
that would otherwise suffer greatly from the split-incentive and lack-of-
capital barriers. 
25 A contract between a shipowner and charterer in which the shipowner agrees to carry goods 
for the charterer or else gives the charterer use of the entire ship for a specific period of time
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Figure 14: Save as You Sail Model
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Clean Marine Energy is a private company based in 
the United States that offers turn-key LNG marine 
bunkering and emissions compliance solutions for 
shipowners operating in the US domestic market 
by providing “no-cost” conversion financing and by 
guaranteeing that shipowners will have secure fuel 
supply and distribution for their converted ships. Clean 
Marine Energy has developed a new financial model, the 
Emission Compliance Service Agreement (ECSA) that 
facilitates the conversion of vessels to run on LNG fuel 
by means of a dual-fuel engine retrofit (Figure 15). The 
ECSA allows third-party financing to cover the upfront 
cost of dual-fuel engine conversion, eliminating the 
need for any upfront capital expenditure on the part 
of the shipowner (currently the ECSA model is only 
suitable for use by owner-operated vessels, as it does 
not include any mechanisms for ships on time charters). 
The financier’s payback and return are generated by 
future fuel cost savings—essentially by a hedge against 
the price spread between low-sulfur diesel and LNG. 
For its part, Clean Marine Energy guarantees supply 
and delivery of LNG to the converted vessel through 
its supply and distribution partner ecosystem, as well 
as advisory services with which the maritime industry 
may evaluate the benefits of using third-party finance 
for fuel conversion projects versus simply relying on 
internal capital.
The SFFSM  
offers the shipping  
industry a method for 
overcoming its barriers of 
capital and split incentives, 
and also allows the fuel 
efficiency technology sector 
to address its specific  
barrier of a lack of 
measurement and 
verification methods
Financier
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Key Features of the ECSA
In piloting the ECSA, Clean Marine Energy is pooling 
the conversion of several vessels, thereby allowing it 
to take advantage of economies of scale and package 
the large-scale investment so as to attract third-
party capital providers that are already comfortable 
with similar financing models, such as for energy 
efficiency retrofits in buildings via ESCOs. Clean 
Marine Energy serves a function similar to that of an 
ESCO by providing “emission compliance (through 
fuel conversion) as a service” to marine vessels 
(Figure 16).
 
Clean Marine Energy is also partnering with 
infrastructure capital providers and LNG suppliers 
to build out the fueling infrastructure necessary for 
ships, overcoming some of the current barriers to 
LNG supply. As each vessel is retrofitted, a roster of 
that vessel’s expected port locations will be analyzed 
to estimate the location and volume of its likely LNG 
demands over its remaining operational life. Clean 
Marine Energy then matches this demand with a 
guaranteed supply, assisting in the development of 
bunkering infrastructure as needed.
To assist shipowners faced with the challenge of ECA 
compliance but who may not be good candidates for 
LNG conversion, perhaps because they operate only 
part time in an ECA and/or in an area where LNG 
prices are relatively expensive, Clean Marine Energy is 
also financing the retrofit of vessels with the exhaust 
gas “scrubber” technologies mentioned earlier. Much 
like a dual-fuel engine conversion, the ECSA financing 
mechanism allows third-party capital providers (e.g., 
private equity, banks) to cover the upfront cost of 
scrubber installation, with their paybacks generated 
from the cost differential between traditional bunker 
fuel and the low-sulfur diesel that the ship would 
have had to use had the scrubber technology not 
been installed.
Illustrative Financials of the ECSA
Upon signing an ECSA, the shipowner agrees to pay a set premium over the 
market rate for LNG for their expected fuel consumption by volume over 
three to five years (depending on a specific vessel’s consumption and capital 
requirements). Even with the premium, the shipowner will enjoy 5–10% fuel 
cost savings for the duration of the ECSA term, compared to the price of the 
low-sulfur diesel that they would otherwise be buying. After the ECSA term,26 
the shipowner will simply purchase LNG at its market rate and receive 100% 
of the fuel cost savings for the remaining life of their ship (Figure 17). If the 
ship switches to regular marine diesel at any time during the ECSA term, 
an additional premium will be applied to the price of that fuel. The ECSA is 
intended to help accelerate the maritime industry’s adoption of LNG fuel by 
mitigating the capital barriers to retrofit engine conversion.
Fuel savings under the ECSA are based on both vessel/engine type and 
sailing schedule, but they are expected to average 30% below the projected 
cost of low-sulfur diesel over the long term, as noted earlier in this paper. 
The projected payback period for shipowners under the ECSA is critically 
dependent on the following factors: 
•  The capital required for the design and installation of the engine conversion 
equipment itself, which is vessel specific, and dependent on the size of the 
LNG storage tanks required for a given vessel’s voyage range.
•  The fuel price spread between low-sulfur diesel oil and natural gas in a 
given geography.
•  A given vessel’s number of days at sea per year.
•  A given vessel’s daily fuel consumption in metric tons. 
26 Completion of the ECSA term is based on meeting a 
volumetric threshold of LNG burned—a more fuel-efficient 
ship would simply have a longer ECSA term.
Figure 17: Fuel Costs under the ECSA
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Figure 16: Structure of the ECSA
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The ECSA: Impact on Market Barriers
The volatile price of LNG, a lack of fuel supply 
or fueling infrastructure, and the high upfront 
costs of engine conversion have historically 
made it uneconomical for a ship to pursue this 
type of retrofit technology. The new ECSA model 
overcomes those barriers by providing the 
upfront capital needed for conversion and then 
guaranteeing the supply and distribution of LNG 
to converted ships. 
General Barrier: Access to and Cost of Capital
Clean Marine Energy offers a financing structure that 
covers 100% of fuel conversion capital costs so that 
shipowners immediately see fuel savings based on 
the price advantage of LNG versus low-sulfur diesel. 
Clean Marine Energy recovers its capital expenditure 
by sharing in the fuel savings with shipowners 
for a few years, and then passes 100% of the fuel 
savings on to the owner. Additionally, to meet the 
challenges faced by shipowners of obtaining internal 
company approval for third-party financing, Clean 
Marine Energy also provides advisory services for 
shipowners seeking to understand the case for fuel 
conversion and all of their options for financing such 
a retrofit.
General Barrier: Split Incentives
As mentioned, the present ECSA model does not 
address the split-incentives problem, and ships that 
are chartered instead of owner-operated would 
still face this barrier in considering an alternative-
fuel-based retrofit as a pathway to managing fuel 
costs and emissions. However, the ECSA could 
theoretically be adapted to work for chartered ships 
in future models.
Barrier Specific to LNG Dual-Fuel Engine Conversion 
Retrofits: Lack of Bunkering Infrastructure
Clean Marine Energy and their strategic partners are 
rapidly developing LNG liquefaction and bunkering 
services to guarantee LNG supply to shipowners. 
Infrastructure build-out will occur in phases, with 
the first supply lines constructed in ECA areas where 
regulations are strict and traffic is high, such as the 
Mississippi River, Gulf of Mexico, or Great Lakes ECAs.
CASE STUDY
Clean Marine Energy Pilot Project
CLEAN MARINE ENERGY has engaged in a pilot program with a ship 
operating on the Great Lakes, a region within the North American ECA, 
to demonstrate the viability of LNG dual-fuel engine conversions under 
the ECSA. The Great Lakes Trader/Joyce L. Van Enkevort is an articulated 
tug barge built and operated by Van Enkevort Tug and Barge, Inc. and 
owned by Great Lakes Maritime Leasing, LLC. The vessel trades dry 
bulk goods, servicing the mining, construction, and steel industries in 
the Great Lakes, and was chosen for this pilot demonstration for the 
following reasons:
•  The economics of the region support retrofitting old ships 
versus building new ships, as Great Lakes vessels typically 
have a long lifespan (often exceeding 60+ years), are costly 
to build, and operate full time within ECA regions.
•  Due to ice build-up on the Lakes, most vessels tend to 
come off hire for several weeks every winter, thus creating a 
window for conversion with low opportunity costs.
•  The Great Lakes Trader/Joyce L. Van Enkevort is 40,000 
deadweight tons (DWT) and consumes a large volume of 
fuel, thus the savings generated by operating with it LNG 
fuel are significant.
•  Several suppliers have announced plans to build facilities that 
would supply LNG around the Great Lakes shipping area.
A feasibility study was conducted with several of Clean Marine Energy’s 
contractor partners that confirmed the vessel would be a suitable 
candidate for retrofit engine conversion. The final steps of the retrofit 
are expected to take place during an upcoming, already-scheduled 
downtime, when permanent fuel tanks and equipment will be installed. 
The retrofit will be financed under the following conditions: 
•  Upfront capital cost of conversion will be financed 100% by 
Clean Marine Energy; ship will purchase LNG fuel from an 
established supplier through the ECSA mechanism.
•  ECSA agreement will have a term of five years.
•  5% immediate fuel cost savings to the shipowner  
(for the term of the ECSA).
•  Projected 30% savings in annual fuel costs to the shipowner 
after the ECSA term, for the remaining life of the asset. 
•  Four to six months for engineering (using a “riding gang,” 
which are groups of workmen who are brought on board a 
ship for specific maintenance or other purposes); 30 days 
out of service to retrofit.
•  Expected completion in Q1 2015.
41INNOVATIVE FINANCIAL MODELS
WWW.CARBONWARROOM.COM
Renewable Bunker Fuels: An Alternate Financial 
Financial Model for Alternative Fuels 
Thus far this paper has discussed a potential financial model for LNG-based 
engine conversions. In the future, alternative shipping fuels like biofuels 
could offer a cost-competitive and cleaner solution than LNG or diesel, 
particularly for vessels operating in ECAs. This is especially true because 
biofuels should be “drop-in” fuels: that is, a ship that currently runs on 
HFO could switch to run on biofuels without a costly engine conversion. 
A 2012 report on the potential of biofuels for maritime shipping 
concluded that a strong market for such fuels should exist in light 
of current policy and support schemes, the high operational costs 
of HFO, and the environmental benefits of moving away from fossil 
fuels of all kinds. However, biofuels for shipping are not currently 
being produced at commercial scale, and the production costs of 
marine biofuels today are therefore higher than those of fossil fuels. 
Eventually, additional technological development and production 
scaling, and therefore cost reductions, could allow marine biofuels to 
be quite cost-competitive with LNG or HFO (Ecofys 2012). 
Once marine biofuel production reaches technologically viable levels, 
innovative financial models will likely be needed for those fuels to be 
produced in great enough quantities to achieve true economies of scale and 
widespread adoption. CWR is currently developing such models to address 
the similar situation now faced by drop-in biofuels in the aviation industry 
(see box on Long-Dated Futures Contracts), and some of the findings of that 
work could be useful in encouraging the development of shipping biofuels.
Once marine biofuel 
production reaches 
technologically viable 
levels, innovative financial 
models will likely be 
needed for those fuels 
to be produced in great 
enough quantities to 
achieve true economies 
of scale and widespread 
adoption
Long-Dated Futures Contracts
CWR AND ITS PARTNERS have been working 
to enable the eventual large-scale production 
of advanced renewable jet fuels by designing a 
financial structure that will provide a powerful 
independent hedge for airlines against the 
potential price volatility of those fuels in the 
interim. CWR has been exploring the possibility 
for renewable jet fuel producers and airlines (jet 
fuel payers) to enter into long-dated futures 
contracts for those biofuels. 
Future-contract models could also serve to 
encourage advancement in and wider production 
of shipping biofuels, but right now neither those 
fuels nor the nascent financial models that would 
support them are well developed enough for 
further consideration in this paper. However, 
much like oil refineries, most biorefineries produce 
multiple grades of fuel products, and therefore 
the efforts of CWR and its partners in the aviation 
industry will, if successful, improve the global 
market for the “whole barrel” of renewable fuels 
and co-products, some of which may be suitable 
for use as marine bunker fuels. 
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investment than  
the cost of fuel efficiency 
technologies on  
a per-ship basis
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he innovative financial models presented in this paper offer different 
mechanisms by which maritime vessels may decrease their operating 
expenses and their emissions per nautical mile, while at the same time 
increasing the value of a shipowner’s asset. This chapter presents a 
comparative analysis of the two models to highlight the relative merits of 
each and their applicability to specific industry actors or financial challenges.
Each of the models is financed in a similar manner; however, the cost to 
retrofit an engine is a substantially bigger investment than the cost of fuel 
efficiency technologies on a per-ship basis.
Figure 18: Criteria of Ideal Vessels
Figure 19: Top-Level Financial Features
Financial 
Model
Defining Vessel Criteria Vessel Age Target Vessels Dry-Dock Required?
SFFSM 
for Fuel 
Efficiency 
Retrofits
Approaching dry-dock, 
long-term time charter (4+ 
years) or owner-operated; 
predicted 5–15% fuel savings 
with < 2-year payback
5+ years old All Requires dry-dock, aligned 
with pre-existing scheduled 
maintenance
ECSA 
for LNG 
Dual-Fuel 
Engine 
Conversion
High fuel consumption 
(30,000+ DWT, 10,000+ 
horsepower)
Slow-speed, 2-stroke engine
Less than 10 years old Vessels operating 
primarily within ECA
Depends on vessel; generally does 
not require dry-dock
Aligned with 5-year special survey
Financial 
Model
Finance 
Provider
Security 
Provisions
Type of 
Finance
% of Upfront 
Capital 
Provided by 
Financier
Financing 
Period
Revenue Model Range of 
Investment 
Size
Counter-
party
SFFSM 
for Fuel 
Efficiency 
Retrofits
Private 
equity and 
bank loans
Guarantee 
from 
credit-
worthy 
partners
Equity 
and/or 
fixed-
interest, 
fixed-
term loan
100% 2–5 
years
Revenue generated 
from fuel savings 
generated by 
the gains in fuel 
efficiency afforded 
by the technologies
$500,000–
$3 million
Owner or 
charterer 
(fuel 
payer)
ECSA 
for LNG 
Dual-Fuel 
Engine 
Conversion
Private 
equity and 
institutional
Guarantee 
from 
credit-
worthy 
partners
Fixed-
cost, 
fixed-
term loan
100% 3–7 
years
Revenue generated 
from fuel cost 
savings, specifically 
the price difference 
between low-sulfur 
diesel and LNG
$5–20 
million
Owner or 
charterer 
(fuel 
payer)
T
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Germany’s built 
environment sector 
offers an illustrative 
example of how using 
public funding  
to finance retrofits  
can have a catalytic 
effect on private  
investments
Risks
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Figure 20: Key Risks and How the Models Address Them 
The linchpin of each of these models is the creation of systems to limit the risks associated with all of the parties.
Financial 
Model
Low Technological 
Performance
Petroleum-Based 
Fuel Prices 
Increase
Petroleum-Based 
Fuel Prices 
Decrease
Counterparty 
Defaults
Vessel Off Hire Vessel Non-Sailing 
But On Hire
SFFSM 
for Fuel 
Efficiency 
Retrofits
Vendors of 
fuel efficiency 
technologies 
manage this risk 
by providing 
guaranteed 
percentages of 
fuel savings
No risk; the 
financier and 
fuel payer, in 
fact, save more
Fuel-saving 
escrow account 
generates 
less revenue, 
extending 
payback time  
to financier 
Finance provider 
manages the 
risks
Mitigated by 
fuel payer 
guaranteeing 
minimum days 
at sea per 
year based on 
historical data
Mitigated by 
fuel payer 
guaranteeing 
minimum days 
at sea per 
year based on 
historical data
ECSA 
for LNG 
Dual-Fuel 
Engine 
Conversion
Engine 
manufacturers 
manage this risk 
by providing 
performance 
guarantees
No risk; the fuel 
cost spread is 
locked for the 
term of the 
ECSA, on top of 
floating index
No risk during 
contract term; 
after contract 
term this simply 
makes LNG fuel 
consumption 
more attractive
Finance provider 
manages the risk
No risk; take or 
pay contract
No risk; take or 
pay contract
The Role of Public Finance in Funding Retrofits: 
A Case Study from the Built Environment
Fuel efficiency and alternative fuel retrofit technologies for maritime vessels are 
well- proven to save fuel costs while reducing emissions. The shipping industry 
needs to widely adopt these technologies if it is to succeed in addressing its 
current economic challenges of rising fuel costs, mounting environmental 
regulations, and the global challenge of climate change. Though CWR does 
not focus on public policy, this paper recognizes that it will be necessary to 
address the current lack of public funding for retrofits. Public funding would 
serve to lower the risk and cost of capital, allowing these financial models to 
be much more widely utilized. 
Germany’s built environment sector offers an illustrative example of how 
using public funding to finance retrofits can have a catalytic effect on private 
investments. The German state development bank, KfW, is the main institution 
with designated finance for building efficiency projects and other energy-
related investments in Germany. Since 1996, KfW has gained substantial 
experience incentivizing investments into thermal efficiency retrofits in the 
residential sector through preferential loans and grants. In 2010, KfW provided 
$11.6 billion in lending and grants to retrofit more than 952,802 residential units 
(Neuhoff et al. 2012). 
KfW is, likewise, one of the top 10 shipping financiers 
worldwide, and though it recently announced that it is 
considering expanding the amount of money it lends 
to shipping, it did not specifically mention any funding 
for retrofits (Reuters 2013). If KfW or a similar financial 
institution were to extend its concessionary loans and 
state guarantees to finance existing vessel retrofits, 
it could accelerate the number of shipping retrofits 
financed around the world and make a substantial 
environmental and monetary impact.
Conclusion and 
Recommendations
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A 10% increase in  
efficiency, assuming 225 days 
at sea with a pre-dry-dock 
consumption of 31 metric tons 
of fuel per day, will deliver fuel 
cost savings of $500,000 per 
year, while also preventing  
the emission of 2,148  
metric tons of CO
2
 into  
the atmosphere
WWW.CARBONWARROOM.COM
47CARBON WAR ROOM RESEARCH REPORT – 2014 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
n today’s maritime industry, innovative financial mechanisms can be 
used to accelerate the deployment of clean, retrofit technologies, 
thereby generating significant fuel cost savings and driving sustainable growth. 
These investments do not rely on carbon markets or other subsidies. Many of 
these technologies deliver paybacks within two years and confer in a higher 
asset value, all while reducing a vessel’s carbon footprint—making them highly 
attractive investments.
The shipping industry needs to widely adopt these financial models—and 
retrofit technologies more generally—in order to address the current economic 
challenges of rising fuel costs, mounting environmental regulations, and the 
global threat of climate change. 
This paper considered two specific financial models for retrofits that will 
improve the profitability of the existing shipping fleet. One, the Self-Financing 
Fuel-Saving Mechanism, facilitates the adoption of fuel efficiency technologies, 
while the other, the Emission Compliance Service Agreement, is designed for 
alternative fuels, specifically LNG dual-fuel engine conversions.
More research into these financial models is required, including an in-depth 
analysis on the impact of price volatility (including in time charter rates and 
in fuel prices) and its costs to the shipping sector. In addition, more research 
should be done to understand the precise fuel savings offered by various retrofit 
options on a vessel-by-vessel basis. Particularly for fuel efficiency technologies, 
the analysis of post-retrofit data that covers an entire dry-docking cycle will 
provide the industry with further transparency on the performance of these 
technologies, the opportunity for investors, and how best to operate vessels 
post-retrofit. With respect to LNG as an alternative fuel, future research should 
look not only at the economic opportunity of LNG but also at its environmental 
impact, as there are a variety of environmental issues associated with natural 
gas and shipping that must be researched further. As the usage of LNG as 
a bunker fuel increases, best practices must be developed and enforced to 
minimize the potential negative environmental and climate impacts of LNG.
Nevertheless, this paper ultimately finds that the savings potential of retrofit 
technologies is such that the market alone provides sufficient incentive 
for their adoption, though a favorable regulatory climate will positively 
contribute. However, certain market barriers, particularly lack of capital, 
split incentives, lack of measurement and verification methods, and a lack 
of LNG infrastructure, need to be overcome. The costs, both economic and 
environmental, of petroleum-based maritime fuels today are such that taking 
serious, collaborative steps towards overcoming these barriers is an industry 
imperative. 
But the potential opportunity is massive. For example, the aggressive 
implementation of a suite of fuel efficiency technologies that delivers a 
fleet-wide 10% efficiency improvement would allow the existing international 
shipping fleet to save $16.6 billion on fuel costs per annum and reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions by up to 87 million metric tons of CO2 per annum, 
while still enjoying strong annual growth.  
27 However, “methane slip” during LNG production may negate the climate-related benefits of 
this CO2 reduction.
Proven fuel efficiency and alternative fuel retrofit 
technologies offer significant opportunities for cost 
savings in the maritime shipping industry, especially at 
today’s HFO prices of just over $600 per ton (Singapore). 
Although there may be a large upfront cost, the payback 
period of many efficiency retrofit technologies is 
anywhere from 12 months to three years for a shipowner, 
which is considerably less than the average 25–30-year 
lifetime of a ship. 
Installing a complimentary suite of fuel efficiency retrofits 
(e.g., a Mewis Duct®, a propeller boss cap fin, premium 
hull coating, and continuous monitoring and optimization 
software) onto a 46,000 DWT bulk carrier can cost over 
$1,000,000 per vessel. Theoretically, this full suite of 
technologies will increase that vessel’s fuel efficiency 
by 10% and, assuming 225 days at sea with a pre-dry-
dock consumption of 31 metric tons of fuel per day, will 
deliver fuel cost savings of $500,000 per year, while 
also preventing the emission of 2,148 metric tons of CO2 
into the atmosphere. The payback period of this suite 
of technologies is therefore in the range of two to three 
years. Fleet-wide investment into fuel efficiency solutions 
can yield even greater savings. 
By contrast, investing in a dual-fuel LNG engine conversion 
on a 46,000 DWT bulk carrier that operates wholly in a 
North American ECA can cost around $10,000,000. The 
cost spread between LNG and low-sulfur fuel in that 
geography will optimally deliver savings of $3,000,000, 
while also preventing the emission 5,250 metric tons of 
CO2 per year and ensuring IMO emission compliance.
27 
The payback period of dual-fuel LNG engine conversion 
for a 46,000 DWT vessel operating wholly in a North 
American ECA is therefore three to four years. 
Note that both of the example calculations offered 
here depend entirely on a wide range of variables for a 
given vessel, including the price of fuel, days at sea per 
annum, daily fuel consumption, and the amount of time 
spent in an ECA.
The financial models reviewed by this paper were chosen 
because they demonstrate innovative thinking around 
third-party financing. The retrofit market is in a state 
of ongoing development, and these financial models 
are likewise continuously evolving, creating additional 
opportunities for their piloting, testing and refinement.
I
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